New ask Hacker News story: Ask HN: We built an air-gapped document vault with encrypted print and export
Ask HN: We built an air-gapped document vault with encrypted print and export
2 by KevinG777 | 0 comments on Hacker News.
Hi HN, We are working on a document vault designed for people and organizations who cannot accept cloud exposure. The system is intentionally boring in some ways: • No required accounts • No cloud dependency for core functionality • Fully offline operation • Local encryption • Air-gapped storage • Encrypted export and controlled, encrypted printing The printing piece is why we started this. In many environments, printing is still unavoidable, and it remains one of the largest data-leak vectors. Most privacy tools stop at storage and ignore output entirely. This is not meant to replace cloud storage for everyone. It is for cases where the threat model assumes: • Networks are hostile • Cloud accounts will eventually be compromised • Convenience must sometimes be traded for control We are explicitly not claiming: • “Unhackable” • “Military-grade” • “Zero risk” We are trying to minimize attack surface and failure modes, not eliminate them. We would genuinely value feedback on: • Threat model blind spots • Encrypted printing assumptions • Physical access risks • Update and key management strategies • What would make you immediately distrust this If this sounds like something you would never use, that is also useful feedback. Thanks.
2 by KevinG777 | 0 comments on Hacker News.
Hi HN, We are working on a document vault designed for people and organizations who cannot accept cloud exposure. The system is intentionally boring in some ways: • No required accounts • No cloud dependency for core functionality • Fully offline operation • Local encryption • Air-gapped storage • Encrypted export and controlled, encrypted printing The printing piece is why we started this. In many environments, printing is still unavoidable, and it remains one of the largest data-leak vectors. Most privacy tools stop at storage and ignore output entirely. This is not meant to replace cloud storage for everyone. It is for cases where the threat model assumes: • Networks are hostile • Cloud accounts will eventually be compromised • Convenience must sometimes be traded for control We are explicitly not claiming: • “Unhackable” • “Military-grade” • “Zero risk” We are trying to minimize attack surface and failure modes, not eliminate them. We would genuinely value feedback on: • Threat model blind spots • Encrypted printing assumptions • Physical access risks • Update and key management strategies • What would make you immediately distrust this If this sounds like something you would never use, that is also useful feedback. Thanks.
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